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Abstract:  Loran  is  a  radio-based  navigation  system  originally  designed  for  naval 
applications.  We  show  that  Loran-C’s  high-power  and  high  repeatable  accuracy  are 
fantastic for security applications. First, we show how to derive a precise location tag—
with a sensitivity of about 20 meters—that is difficult to project to an exact location. A 
device can use our location tag to block or allow certain actions, without knowing its 
precise location. To ensure that our tag is reproducible we make use of fuzzy extractors, a 
mechanism originally designed for biometric authentication. We build a fuzzy extractor 
specifically  designed  for  radio-type  errors  and  give  experimental  evidence  to  show  its 
effectiveness. Second, we show that our location tag is difficult to predict from a distance. 
For example, an observer cannot predict the location tag inside a guarded data center from 
a few hundreds of meters away. As an application, consider a location-aware disk drive that 
will only work inside the data center. An attacker who steals the device and is capable of 
spoofing Loran-C signals, still cannot make the device work since he does not know what 
location tag to spoof. We provide experimental data supporting our unpredictability claim.  
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1. Introduction  
When a device wishes to determine its position, it does two things. First, the hardware uses an 
antenna and receiver to capture and record a location measurement. Second, the location measurement 
is converted into a global position in the form of longitude and latitude. Most often these two steps are 
conflated, and both are seen as necessary to enable location-based applications. In this paper we argue 
that for many security applications only the first step is needed: there is no need to accurately map the 
location  measurement  to  an  accurate  global  position. Therefore,  these  location-based  security 
applications can be implemented using a variety of radio frequency (RF) signals, including broadcast 
communication  signals,  such  as  AM/FM,  cellular,  DTV,  Wi-Fi,  etc.,  navigation  signals,  and  an 
integration of various signals.  
While GPS provides accurate position data, other location services are far less accurate. LOng 
RAnge Navigation (Loran) [1], for example, uses a 3 km wavelength, and standalone Loran has an 
absolute accuracy of several hundred meters. Loran-C, the most recent version of Loran in use, is a 
terrestrial navigation system originally designed for naval applications and its operation is described in 
Appendix A. Its modernized version, called enhanced Loran (eLoran) [2], together with differential 
corrections can achieve an accuracy of 8 to 20 meters. This paper uses standalone Loran-C, which has 
good repeatable accuracy, but low absolute accuracy, as a case study and shows that high absolute 
accuracy  is  not  a  requirement  for  a  number  of  location-based  security  applications.  As  with  all  
radio-based  systems,  Loran-C  radio  signals  are  distorted  by  buildings  and  other  objects,  causing 
measurements to change greatly over short distances. Our main result shows that one can exploit these 
chaotic changes to obtain a precise and reproducible location tag with an accuracy of about 20 meters. 
Reproducibility means that measurements at the same location at different times always produce the 
same tag. While there is no way to map location measurements to an accurate position, there are still 
many applications, primarily security applications, for which a reproducible and precise tag is sufficient. 
We build a reproducible and precise tag using recent  results  from  biometric authentication  for 
location-based  security  applications.  In  particular,  we  rely  on  fuzzy  extractors  [3,4]  and  secure 
sketches  [5,6],  originally  designed  for  fingerprint-based  authentication.  The  idea  is  to  store  some 
public information that enables anyone to convert an erroneous measurement into a consistent tag. We 
develop specific fuzzy extractors designed to handle radio-type errors. The challenge is to correct for 
signal variations due to day/night, humidity, and seasonal changes.  
Although the absolute accuracy of standalone Loran-C is not comparable to that of GPS, it has 
several advantages over GPS for security applications. First, Loran-C is a high power terrestrial signal 
and easily penetrates buildings and cities. GPS, which has extremely weak signals below the thermal 
noise floor, is usually not available inside buildings. Second, we show that our radio-based location tag 
is unpredictable at a distance: an attacker who is several hundred meters away from a target location 
cannot predict the tag at the target. The reason is that signal attenuation by buildings is chaotic and 
difficult to interpolate. We give experimental evidence for this claim and discuss some applications. In 
contrast, GPS is, by design, predictable from a great distance and consequently GPS cannot be used for 
applications that require a secret location tag. Third, Loran-C has good regional coverage in Northern 
Europe and much of East Asia, like China, Japan, and Korea. Although the transmission of Loran-C 
signals in North America has been terminated in February 2010, the decision with eLoran has yet to be Sensors 2010, 10                         
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made. eLoran will have a data channel [2]. While some uses of the data have been defined, others have 
not. Therefore, several message types have been left unassigned to support useful application such as 
location-based security in the course of eLoran design. Loran antenna size may have been a practical 
issue in many applications. Recent research has shown that a miniature H-field antenna of 2 ×  2 cm 
can be achieved [7]. With this size, a Loran H-field antenna can be easily fit into a number of portable 
electronic devices.  
Our goal is to develop a standardized process to quantify the precision, reproducibility and security 
of a location tag  for security applications. The design and implementation of fuzzy extractors for 
location-based security discussed in this paper will apply to all radio-based signals. We use Loran-C as 
a convenient example and evaluate the location tag performance using real data.  
1.1. Security Applications 
We discuss a number of security applications where the properties of our location tag—precise, 
reproducible, and unpredictable at a distance—come into play. We reiterate that although our tag is 
very sensitive to spatial changes, it cannot be used to obtain position information (latitude/longitude) 
of that accuracy. In all our examples we assume the device is tamper resistant so that bypassing the 
location tag check is difficult. 
 
1.1.1. Digital Manners Policies (DMP) 
 
Technologies for digital manners (DMP) [8] attempt to enforce manners at public locations. A 
DMP-enabled cell phone can be programmed by the phone provider to turn off the camera while inside 
a hospital, a locker room, or a classified installation. Or the phone can be programmed to switch to 
vibrate mode while inside a movie theater. Many other applications have been considered. Although 
these  ideas  are  highly  controversial  [9],  we  only  focus  on  the  technical  contents  and  feasible 
implementation of the ideas. 
To implement DMP one assumes that the device needs to know its precise location. We argue that 
this is incorrect. Using our radio-based tag, one can build a list of location tags where the camera is to 
be  turned  off.  The  device  downloads  an  updated  list  periodically.  When  the  device  encounters  a 
location tag on this blocklist, it turns the camera off. When the device leaves the blocked location the 
camera is turned back on. Hence, digital manners are enforced without ever telling the device its 
precise location. 
A DMP system must survive the following attack: the attacker owns the device and tries to make 
the device think it is somewhere else. Since most places are not blocked, any location confusion will 
do. To survive this threat any location-based DMP system must make the following two assumptions: 
  First the device, including the antenna connection, must be tamper resistant. If the antenna 
connection is not protected then anyone can tamper with signals from the antenna. The simplest 
attack is to add a delay loop to the antenna. Since location measurements are time based, the 
delay loop will fool the device into thinking it is somewhere else. 
  Second, it should be difficult to spoof the Loran-C radio signals by transmitting fake signals 
from a nearby transmitter. The safest defense against spoofing is cryptographic authentication Sensors 2010, 10                         
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for Loran-C signals. Qiu et al. [10] proposed a clever method for embedding TESLA [11] 
authenticators  into  Loran-C  signals  to  prevent  spoofing.  We  point  out  that  even  without 
cryptography, spoofing Loran-C signals is far harder than spoofing GPS: In fact, GPS spoofers 
are commercially available and are regularly used by GPS vendors for testing their products.  
Both assumptions are necessary to build an effective DMP system regardless of the navigation 
system used. Our goal is not to promote DMP but rather to show that an accurate DMP system can be 
built from standalone Loran-C signals. 
 
1.1.2. Location Based access Control 
While  DMP  is  a  blocklisting  application,  access  control  is  a  whitelisting  example.  Consider  a 
location-aware disk drive. The drive can be programmed to work only while safely in the data center. 
An attacker who steals the device will not be able to interact with it.  
We consider two attack models:  
  Private locations: suppose the device is located in a guarded data center and the attacker has no 
access  to  the  insides  of  the  data  center.  The  attacker  steals  the  device  (say,  while  in  
transit [12]) and tries to make the device think it is still in the data center.  
  Public  locations:  in  this  case  the  attacker  has  complete  access  to  the  data  center  and  the 
attacker can measure the authorized location tag. After stealing the device the attacker can try 
to spoof the Loran-C signal to make the device think it is still in the data center. Unlike the 
DMP application where any location confusion was sufficient for the attacker, here the attacker 
must cause the device to think it is precisely in the right place in the data center, with 20 meter 
accuracy. Simply adding delay loops to the antenna will not work.  
In both threat models we must assume that the device is tamper resistant. Otherwise, the attacker 
can simply modify the device and bypass the location check. In the case of a public location we must 
also assume cryptographic authentication on Loran-C signals, as discussed in the DMP application. 
Interestingly,  for  the  private  location  settings,  the  unpredictability  of  the  Loran-C  location  tag 
implies that we do not need any signal authentication nor do we need to protect the antenna connection 
to the device. In Section 4 we show that if the attacker has never been in the data center then he cannot 
tell for sure what location tag should be supplied. We show that even if the attacker takes many 
measurements several hundreds of meters away (say in the parking lot) he still cannot tell for sure what 
tag to supply.  
One option available to the attacker is to build a list of candidate location tags and try them one by 
one. In Section 4 we show that the list would need to include several dozen candidate tags. But the 
device can easily shutdown if it ever receives a sequence of incorrect location tags. Consequently, a 
trial and error attack will not get very far. 
We note that location-based access control using encryption was studied by Scott and Denning [13] 
under the name Geoencryption, which uses physical locations, such as latitude, longitude and altitude 
measurements  from  GPS,  for  security  applications.  Our  location  tag  derived  from  raw  location 
measurements is more unpredictable and provides more information entropy,  
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2. Background on Fuzzy Extractors 
In the previous section we showed applications for a precise and reproducible location tag. We now 
show  how  to  build  such  tags  using  standalone  Loran-C  system.  To  ensure  that  our  tags  are 
reproducible we will make use of fuzzy extractors [3,5]. Fuzzy extractors were originally designed for 
biometric authentication systems. Since biometric scanners introduce errors, one needs same way to 
extract a reproducible tag from the scanner’s output. While biometric fuzzy extractors are designed 
with a specific error model in mind, here we need a fuzzy extractor tailored for the Loran error model. 
 
2.1. Fuzzy Extractors: Definitions 
 
We follow the definitions in [5]. Measurements live in a set M which is equipped with a distance 
function denoted dis. Roughly speaking, dis(x,y) is small if x is ―close‖ to y.  
Fuzzy extractor. A fuzzy extractor works in two steps, as shown in Figure 1. During the registration 
step one runs algorithm Gen on input xM to generate a public value P and a tag T. Later, given a 
noisy version of x, denoted x’, one runs algorithm Rep on input x’ and P to reproduce the tag T. The 
idea is that if x and x’ are fingerprint scans of the same finger, then x is ―close‖ to x’ and both should 
produce the same tag T. If T has sufficient entropy then it can used as a login password. Clearly we 
require that P reveal little or no information about the tag T. 
Definition 1. A fuzzy extractor is a tuple (M, t0, t1, Gen, Rep), where M is the metric space with a 
distance function dis, Gen is a generate procedure and Rep is a reproduce procedure, which has the 
following properties: 
If Gen(x) outputs (T, P), then Rep(x’, P) = T, whenever dis(x, x’) ≤ t0. If dis(x, x’) ≥ t0, then there is 
no guarantee T will be output. In addition, if dis(x, x’) ≥ t1, Rep(x’, P) = T’, and T’ ≠ T.  
Figure 1. Fuzzy extractor in action. 
 
2.2. Known Constructions for Fuzzy Extractors 
Initial  constructions  were  proposed  by  Juels  and  Wattenberg  [3].  Their  scheme  uses  an  error 
correcting code to handle the hamming metric on binary data. Juels and Sudan [4] provide a fuzzy 
extractor  for  the  set  difference  metric,  which  is  the  first  construction  for  a  non-hamming  metric.  
Dodis  et  al.  [5]  give  precise  definitions  for  the  problem  and  provide  constructions  for  hamming 
distance, set distance and edit distance.  
All these schemes primarily apply to binary data which does not fit our settings where location 
measurements are vectors of real numbers. One exception is a construction of Chang and Li [14] that 
can be adapted to give a fuzzy extractor for the scenario where one of the Loran-C transmitters is 
offline (e.g., for maintenance).  
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3. Generating a Reproducible and Precise Location Tag from Loran-C  
Our goal is to build a reproducible and precise tag from standalone Loran-C measurements. We first 
explain  what  a  Loran-C  measurement  looks  like  and  then  discuss  the  error  model  for  these 
measurements. Finally, we present a simple fuzzy extractor for this error model. 
Loran-C measurements. Radio-based navigation uses signals from multiple transmitters to estimate 
the receiver’s positions. Loran-C is a terrestrial, low frequency pulsed navigation system that operates 
in much of the northern hemisphere and uses static transmitters. Four transmitters on the west coast of 
the US, called the west coast Loran chain (GRI9940) are used for navigation in the western US. These 
four stations are located at Fallon, NV; George, WA; Middletown, CA; and Searchlight, NV. Pulses 
from this chain are broadcast every 0.0994 seconds. Fallon is the master station and the remaining 
three follow in sync. From each station we obtain three values, called features, per pulse: 
  Time-of-arrival (TOA) or time difference (TD): measures the propagation time from the 
transmitter to the receiver, 
  envelope-to-cycle difference (ECD): measures carrier propagation rate, and 
  signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).  
An example measurement from the Middletown, CA station taken at Stanford is a triple: 
(496.8 microseconds, −0.145 microseconds, 41 dB) 
The exact meaning of these numbers is not important for our discussion here. What is important is 
that each transmitter produces a triple of real numbers (features) per pulse. Collecting the signals from 
all four stations gives a 12-dimensional real vector from which we wish to derive a location tag. 
Loran-C error patterns. Due to measurement errors and environmental changes, taking multiple 
measurements at the same location, but at different times, produces different 12 dimensional vectors. 
Figure  2  shows  temporal  variations  in  the  triple  (TOA,  ECD  and  SNR)  as  measured  from  the 
Middletown station over a 90 day period. These measurements were taken at Stanford, CA. The wild 
swings in TOA, for example, reflect seasonal variations between winter and spring. We next explain 
the reason for these variations and how to model them. 
  The most common error source is the thermal noise in all electronic devices, considered as 
white Gaussian noise. This noise cannot be eliminated and is always presenting in all electronic 
devices and transmission media.  
  Many environmental factors cause signal  variation, including temperature changes  between 
night and day, changes in soil conductivity over time, humidity, local weather, etc. [15]. In 
particular,  temperature  and  humidity  variations  have  a  considerable  effect  on  propagation 
speed. The extra delay in propagation time or TOA can introduce a position error of hundreds 
of meters [16]. This particular error source in Loran is called additional secondary factor (ASF) 
and represents one of the largest error sources in Loran.  
  Location vectors are continuous and need to be quantized. Quantization error, which is the 
difference between value of continuous feature and the quantized value, can lead to errors in Sensors 2010, 10                         
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the derived location tag. The quantization error is usually correlated with the two types of 
errors discussed above.  
  The last type error results from maintenance of any radio-based system. A transmitter can go 
offline, in which case we lose all measurements associated with that station. Ideally, we would 
like this to have no effect on the location tag produced by our system.  
Figure 2. Stanford seasonal monitor data for 90-day period for Middletown, CA: (a) TOA;  
(b) ECD; (c) SNR. 
 
A fuzzy extractor for Loran signals must take seasonal variations into account and can correct errors 
differently depending on the time of year.  
 
3.1. Fuzzy Extractors for Location-Based Services 
 
Construction 1: Fuzzy extractor for Euclidean distance 
 
We propose a fuzzy extractor when all Loran-C transmitters are present. Thus the features are real 
numbers over R and Euclidean distance is sufficient for the distance metric. Let x be a location feature 
vector at registration while x’ be the feature vector at verification time,  is the step size to quantize the 
feature. The distance dis(x, x’) can be bounded by adequate threshold. This threshold, , can be a 
design parameter. We need to develop a fuzzy extractor that can reproduce tag T when the errors  
|x − x’| ≤ . This fuzzy extractor is designed to tolerate the random noise, biases and quantization errors. 
Let the metric space ii]
n, n = 12 if we use the triple from four Loran-C stations. Thus x, x’ 
and are vectors that have n dimensions. The quantization step is a design parameter and chosen by 
a user. We will discuss how to choose reliable in Section 3.2. We consider the distance measure for 
Loran-C features is L∞ norm to be conservative:  

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The construction of fuzzy extractor for Euclidean distance is as follows: during registration, feature 
vector x is quantized to get T and store public value P, whereas, during verification, given a slightly 
different  location  feature  x’  and  P,  compute  T’.  P,  T  and  T’  are  also  n-dimensional  vectors.  Pi 
represents the i
th feature in vector P. The elements in vector T are integers but they are not necessarily Sensors 2010, 10                         
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positive. For instance, it is possible to result in a negative TD if the distance between the secondary 
station and a user is shorter than the distance between master station and the user. The basic idea of 
this fuzzy extractor is to adjust the offsets between the continuous features and the discrete ones due  
to quantization: 
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Claim  1.  If 
2
1
) ' , (  x x dis ,  then  tag  T  can  be  reproduced,  that  is,  T’  =  T.  This  claim  defines  the 
reproducibility of location tags. If x’ is measured at the same location of x, we can reproduce T when 
the distance of x and x’ is less than /2. 
Claim 2. If dis(x, x’) ≥ t1, then tag T’ ≠ T. This claim defines the precision of locations tags. If x’ is 
measured at a different location but close to the location of x, it is not expected that x’ achieves the 
same tag as x. 
It is easy to see that our construction is a fuzzy extractor (as in Definition 1).  
Construction 2: Secret Sharing Based Fuzzy Extractor for Hamming Distance 
The distance metric in this construction is hamming. The input to the fuzzy extractor is quantized 
feature vector qx instead of x, where  
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 is n-dimensional. The scheme is based on the property 
of secret sharing: a secret can be reconstructed given a subset of shared information. The construction 
is as follows: 
  Create a polynomial f(x), such that f(i) = qxi, i = 1, 2, …, n. 
  Let m be an integer and m < n. 
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Claim 3. If dis(qx, qx’) ≤ n − m, then tag T can be reproduced. When the hamming distance between two 
vectors is less than n - m, the polynomial f(x) can be reconstructed with the assistance of P thus T’ = T.  
Claim 4. If dis(qx, qx’) > n − m, then tag T’ ≠ T. The precision of location tag T relies on the features 
x1,..,xm. This construction increases reproducibility but reduces entropy because we only use m out of n 
features to compute a tag. Sensors 2010, 10                         
 
11377 
3.2. Experimental Results 
In this section we use real standalone Loran-C data to evaluate the precision and reproducibility of 
Loran-C location tag and evaluate the effect of the Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor. We performed 
two experiments: (1) data was collected at various test locations to examine the precision of tags, and 
(2) data was collected at one location over 90-day period to study the reproducibility of tags. 
 
Data at Different Locations Evaluating Tag Precision  
We selected three different environments, where our proposed location-based security applications 
may occur, to perform the precision test: parking structure, soccer field and office building. At each 
location we used multiple test points for five minutes at each test point. An H-field antenna and Locus 
Satmate receiver, shown in Figure 3, were used for the data collection. The receiver averages and 
outputs Loran location features every minute.  
Figure 3. Loran-C H-field antenna (left); SatMate receiver (right). 
 
  Scenario 1. The first data set was collected at 21 different test points on the top floor of a 
parking structure at Stanford University. This place has open sky view and no obstruction from 
the environments but there are some metal structures nearby. The altitude is relatively high 
compared  with  the  other  two  scenarios.  The  dimension  of  the  parking  structure  is 
approximately 70 ×  50 meters. 
  Scenario 2. The second data set selected 16 test points in a soccer field. This environment has 
some obstructions from trees and buildings. The field has a dimension of 176 ×  70 meters so 
the distribution of the test locations are less dense compared to the other two scenarios.  
  Scenario 3. The third data set, which includes 21 test points, was collected on the top floor both 
inside  and  outside  a  building.  The  concrete  building  with  metal  frames  attenuates  signal 
strength more but introduces more uniqueness in the location features, which can be beneficial 
to the computation of location tags. 
We  used  the  triple  (TD,  ECD,  SNR)  from  four  stations  in  the  west  coast  chain  (GRI  9940). 
Quantization steps are chosen based on the measured SNR. Low SNR signals are often attenuated 
more and pick up more noise. In general, features from low SNR stations are less consistent; thus 
larger quantization steps should be applied. We then created two-dimensional cells using Voronoi 
diagrams  and  mapped  the  tags  into  the  cells  accordingly.  The  color  map  is  superimposed  on  the 
Google map. A color bar is used to label the hexadecimals of the first 16-bit of tag. This distribution 
plot can help us visualize how location tag varies in a two-dimensional view. Each black dot together 
with the numbered label at the center of the cells represents a test location.  Sensors 2010, 10                         
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The  left  of  Figure  4  is  the  tag  plot  on  the  top  floor  of  the  parking  structure,  the  middle  plot 
represents the results of a soccer field, and the right plot shows the top floor/roof of Durand building. 
Loran signals are very sensitive to the environment, especially to metal structures. The re-radiation of 
signals  from  metals  can  cause  more  distortion  to  the  RF  signals  thus  higher  precision  or  spatial 
variation of tags at certain locations. We observe this from the location tag maps of scenario 1 and 
scenario 3. The locations with very small separations still result in different location tags. It is worth to 
mention that only two stations, Fallon and Middletown, are used to compute tags for scenario 3, while 
the other two scenarios use all four stations from GRI 9940. Due to the low signal strength indoors, the 
SatMate receiver was not able to acquire the other two low SNR stations, George and Searchlight. The 
averaged precision of three different scenarios is as follows:  
  The precision of Loran-C tags in the parking structure ranges from 8 meters to 35 meters. There 
are four locations that resulted in the same tag shown in dark blue on the left of Figure 4. 
  The precision of tags in the soccer field is lower compared with that of the parking structure 
due to the large separations between the selected test locations or insufficient number of test 
points used. The averaged size of the colored cells that represents location tag is approximately 
30 ×  50 meters. 
  Although the indoor signals are not good enough to solve a position fix because low-SNR 
signals are not able to track. The generation of a location tag does not rely on the  solved 
position fix as the location tags are derived from location-dependent features. As a result, it is 
not required to have more than four transmitters to implement location-based security although 
more transmitters would provide more information entropy or longer tag to the system. The 
smallest colored cell or the highest tag precision in this indoor scenario is approximately 5 meters 
depicted in purple in the middle of the right plot in Figure 4. An upper bound on actual tag 
precision at this location is the largest cell, 8 ×  20 meters. 
   
Figure  4.  Visualization  of  location  tags:  (a)  parking  structure  (left);  (b)  soccer  field 
(middle); (c) Durand building (right). 
 
 
Data at One Location Evaluating Reproducibility  
In this section we use the seasonal data shown in Figure 2 to compare the reproducibility of a 
location tag with and without a fuzzy extractor. Again same triple is used in this experiment. We use Sensors 2010, 10                         
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TD instead of TOA to minimize the impact of ASF errors: TOA of the master station is used as a 
reference to mitigate the temporal variations of secondary stations. Our experiments show that the 
standard deviation of TOA from Middletown is 12.19 meters and the standard deviation of TD from 
Middletown  is  reduced  to  3.83  meters  [17].  However,  TD  provides  less  information  entropy  in 
comparison with TOA as we lose the TOA entropy from master station.  
Performance  metrics.  Before  we  discuss  the  experimental  results  from  the  seasonal  data  we 
introduce the performance metrics that help to quantify and measure the reproducibility of a location 
tag. The problem of deciding whether the derived location tag is authentic or not, can be seen as a 
hypothesis testing problem. The task is to decide which of the two hypotheses H0 (accepting as an 
authorized  user)  or  H1  (rejecting  as  an  attacker)  is  true  for  the  observed  location  measurements. 
Location-based system makes two types of errors: (1) mistaking the measurements or derived tag from 
the same location to be from two different locations and accepting hypothesis H1 when H0 is true, 
called false reject; and (2) mistaking the measurements or derived tags from two different locations to 
be from the same location and accepting H0 when H1 is true, called false accept. Both false reject rate 
(FRR) and false accept rate (FAR) depend on the accuracy of equipments used, step sizes chosen to 
quantize location features and environmental conditions. These two types of errors can be traded off 
against each other by varying the quantization steps. A more secure system aims for low FARs at the 
expense of high FRRs, while a more convenient system aims for low FRRs at the expense of high 
FARs. Figure 5 illustrates the two error rates of location tags with the assumption that the probability 
distributions are Gaussian, which is not necessarily true in practice. The grey tails represent the false 
reject of an authorized user while the red area is the false accept of an attacker.  
 
Figure 5. Performance metrics illustration. 
 
 
Choosing a reliable quantization step for a location feature. Users’ false reject rate significantly 
depends on the standard deviation of the features. Large standard deviation implies high temporal 
variations; thus the distance between the received features at verification and the ones at registration 
might be large. Therefore, the quantization step should be chosen to be proportional to the standard 
deviation of features. In this analysis we show that the quantization step has to be larger than 4to 
achieve  reasonably  small  FRR,  less  than  0.1.  The  FRR  analysis  is  illustrated  in  Figure  6.  The 
quantization  step  ranges  from    to  6.  The  x-axis  is  the  feature  offset  between  registration  and 
verification. The y-axis is the estimated FRR. The solid lines are analytical results and we assumed the 
distribution of location feature is near-Gaussian after the ASF mitigation. The dots are derived using 
the seasonal data. We used ECD from four stations in this experiment. To estimate FRR we take the 
first day of the 90-day ECD data as registration to compute a location tag and the data from the rest  
of  89  days  for  verification.  The  experimental  FRR  is  the  number  of  days,  in  which  the  tags  are Sensors 2010, 10                         
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matched with the registered tag on day one, divided by 89. The experimental results match well with 
the analytical curves. As expected, FRR increases as offset goes up and quantization step goes down. 
 
Figure 6. FRR of a location feature. 
 
 
 
Using multiple features. The derived FRR in Figure 6 only represents the error rate of one particular 
location feature. Practically, multiple features are used to achieve more entropy, precision and higher 
difficulty in predicting the desired tag. However, one drawback using multiple features is that the FRR 
of the system is increased or reproducibility is reduced. The system FRR can be estimated as  
n
i i p 1 if 
we assume the location features are independent from each other, where  pi is the error rate of one 
feature. Practically, location features are slightly correlated in some environments. For instance, the 
signal strength is inversely proportional to the propagation distance, which is determined by TOA. 
This is true when the antenna is placed in an open sky area and has no obstructions from surroundings. 
To solve the reliability problem using multiple features, secret sharing based fuzzy extractor can be 
used together with the Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor. Only a subset of features is used to compute 
tags thus the total FRR is limited. 
Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor performance of multiple features. Now we use the triple from four 
stations to evaluate experimentally the performance of Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor. We reduce 
the quantization steps of the features  gradually to observe the change of FRR and the number of 
quantization levels, which determine the entropy of location tag. The plot is shown in Figure 7. The 
blue line represents the FRR without the use of the fuzzy extractor while the red line is the results 
using the fuzzy extractor. As expected, the FRR is dramatically reduced after the use of the fuzzy 
extractor. The fuzzy extractor guarantees the measurements lying in the center of quantization interval. 
The graph shows that we can achieve total entropy of 86 bits with FRR is less 0.1 with adequate 
quantization steps. 
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Figure 7. Performance of Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor. 
 
 
4. Loran-C Tags are Unpredictable 
 
Next we ask whether Loran-C tags are predictable from a distance. In this paper unpredictability 
refers to the difficulty of an individual in predicting the Loran measurements at a given time and place. 
The  temporal  variations  due  to  propagation  path  delay  variations  and  skywave  as  well  as  the 
unexpected distortions in the RF signals due to local features such as buildings and large metallic 
structures can introduce randomness and entropy in the generation of a location tag, which makes 
attackers to take more time and effort to break into the system.  
We discussed applications for this unpredictability test in Section 1.1. To justify the claim that 
Loran-C tags are unpredictable, we perform two experiments. While we cannot prove the difficulty of 
prediction mathematically as it is not possible to come up a universal model that suits for all the 
environments;  however,  we  can  show  the  nonlinear  of  the  Loran-C  features  experimentally.  The 
predictions  can  be  based  on  path  propagation,  reflection,  diffraction,  diffuse  wall  scattering  and 
transmission through various materials. The sum of all the components is taken to get TD, ECD and 
SNR. Moving objects like people can cause not only attenuation but also fluctuation. The irregularities 
make the prediction even harder.  
We perform the following two experiments to test the difficulty to predict a location tag. The first 
experiment uses the data set collected in a parking structure from 11 test points. The test locations are 
lined up in one dimension and the separation between adjacent points is approximately three meters. 
We chose the first point as our target or user location. Figure 8 plots the spatial variations of TD of 
George, Middletown and Searchlight. The x-axis is the measured distance of test points from the target 
point. The y-axis is the relative TD in microseconds. We zeroed out the means of the TDs to achieve 
the  same  scale  for  the  measurements  from  three  stations.  The  nonlinearity  of  the  Loran-C 
measurements is clear from the graph. Low-SNR stations, George and Searchlight, are attenuated more 
from the obstructions in the environment compared to the strongest station Middletown. This results in 
more nonlinear variations in the low-SNR stations.  
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Figure 8. Spatial variation of TD measurements collected in a parking structure. 
 
The second experiment uses the same data set collected in Durand building for the precision test 
discussed in Section 3. We chose the center point as our target point and measured Loran-C features 
with  increasing distances  from  the target  point. The point is  shown as white dots  in  the plots  of  
Figure 9. The color contour plot is again superimposed on the Google map. The color bar shown at the 
bottom represents feature values of various locations. Figure 9 illustrates the spatial variations of TD, 
ECD and Signal strength measured from Middletown. If feature variations are linearly proportional to 
distance, the color of the map should change from blue to red gradually with  equal diameter. We 
observe that ECD are more nonlinear in comparison with TD and signal strength because phase is very 
sensitive  to  building  structures  and  environments.  The  non-linearity  of  location  features  can 
significantly benefit the design of location-based security applications as it results in the features are 
highly unpredictable. 
Figure 9. Spatial variation of location data from Middletown in Durand building: (a) TD; 
(b) ECD; (c) Signal strength. 
 
5. Conclusions  
We showed that a radio navigation system with high absolute accuracy and low repeatable accuracy 
such as standalone Loran-C can be used to generate a precise and reproducible location tag. A location Sensors 2010, 10                         
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tag  is  computed  from  location-dependent  features  and  can  be  used  for  a  number  of  security 
applications. A location tag is not a replacement but builds on the conventional security schemes. We 
discussed applications to DMP, inventory control and data access control. 
Fuzzy extractors were developed for radio-based signals to achieve high consistency. Euclidean 
metric  fuzzy  extractor  and  Hamming  metric  fuzzy  extractor  were  designed  for  different  location 
measurement  errors.  Adequate  quantization  step  should  be  chosen  as  it  determines  the  system 
performance. FAR and FRR can be traded off by varying the quantization steps of location features. 
We used Loran-C real data to show that the Euclidean metric fuzzy extractor significantly improves 
the reproducibility of a generated location tag. In addition we proved that the Loran-C location features 
can achieve high spatial variation using measurements at three different sites, a parking structure, a 
soccer field and an office building. In addition, we gave evidence that the tag is unpredictable from a 
distance, which is beneficial to location-based security applications. 
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Appendix A. Loran Background 
Loran is a navigation system that operates at 100 kHz. It was developed during World War II and 
played a significant role in marine navigation [1]. In this section we present the background on Loran 
and its operations.  
A.1. Basics of Loran  
Loran provides position using differences in the arrival time of radio frequency (RF) signals from 
various stations. Loran stations broadcast pulsed signals in groups called chains, each of which provide Sensors 2010, 10                         
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coverage to a particular geographic region. Each chain consists of one master station M and several 
secondary stations, which use letters W, X, Y, and Z. Secondary stations have eight pulses while a 
master station has nine pulses and the last pulse is used for identification of the master stations. The 
pulses of each chain are broadcasted repetitively in a constant time interval called group repetition 
interval  (GRI).  The  repetition  interval  of  each  GRI  is  designed  to  be  different  for  cross-rate 
interference rejection. The pulse separation of a station is 1,000 sec while the last pulse in the master 
station is 2,000 sec away from the eighth pulse. The west coast chain is GRI 9940 and its pulses 
broadcast every 0.0994 seconds. Loran stations are synchronized and the timing of the transmission of 
stations are controlled by System Area Monitor. Figure 10 illustrates a Loran chain and ideal pulse.  
Figure 10. (a) Loran chain signals and ideal pulse (left); (b) hyperbolic positioning (right). 
 
 
A.2. Hyperbolic Positioning 
Loran uses hyperbolic positioning technique to estimate one’s location. The basic idea is illustrated 
in Figure 10(b) for 2-D positioning. The red dot indicates a user’s location. The dotted lines represent 
the line of position (LOP), determined from the received time difference of each station. A minimum 
of three stations are needed in order to form two equations and solve latitude and longitude, which are 
the unknowns here. More stations can be used to resolve ambiguity thus provide better geometry and 
accuracy for the position estimation.  
 
A.3. Ninth-Pulse Modulation  
The current proposal of LDC is ninth-pulse modulation [18]. The modulation is chosen to minimize 
the impacts on the current operational Loran signal. An additional pulse is inserted after the eighth 
pulse of pulse group of secondary stations with a minimum of 1,000 sec separation. Third-two state 
Pulse Position Modulation (PPM 32) is used to change the time delay of the ninth pulse after the eighth 
navigation pulse. Each ninth-pulse carries five data bits. 
Loran  message structure. Under the current  proposed ninth pulse  communications,  each  Loran 
message  has  120  bits  and  consists  of  a  4-bit  header,  a  41-bit  payload,  and  75-bit  parity  
component [18]. The Reed-Solomon codes are used for parity check. This forward error correction Sensors 2010, 10                         
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coding  method  provides  error  correction  capacity  and  integrity.  It  provides  to  ability  to  align  the 
message and to verify that the message has been validly decoded with high probability.  
Demodulation. The performance of demodulation technique in the presence of noise determines the 
required SNR and signal power necessary to receive data. One demodulation technique to demodulate 9
th 
pulse data is matched filter [18]. A matched filter performs convolutions of a time-reversed version of a 
reference signal with the input signal. By multiplying the input signal with a time shifted version of the 
reference signal and integrating the product, the maximum of the integrals is the demodulated symbol. 
Appendix B. Short Survey on Signal Authentication 
The main challenge of secure broadcast communication is source authentication, and the problem is 
complicated by untrusted or uncertified users and unreliable communication environments. Source 
authentication helps the receivers to verify the received data originates from the source and has been 
modified in transit. 
In this section we have a survey on authenticating radio navigation signals using cryptographic 
authentication algorithms. We will use the U.S. satellite navigation system Global Positioning System 
(GPS), the upcoming European satellite navigation system Galieo and Loran as examples to study 
different  schemes  and  implementations  of  signal  authentication.  Even  though  the  history  of  radio 
navigation system can go back to 1940s when MIT first developed Loran, the radio navigation signals 
were not self-authenticated until GPS was operational. 
 
B.1. GPS Signal Architecture for Military 
 
The system was initially designed for Military use. The GPS signal consists of spreading code or 
pseudo-random noise (PRN) code for ranging, a RF carrier and navigation data. The military signal has 
different architectures from the civil signal: faster chipping rate and longer period on the spreading 
code  for  higher  position  precision;  encrypted  codes  for  protection  against  spoofing  threats.  The 
precision code is called P-code and together with the encrypted version Y-code, called P(Y) codes. 
Only  military  authorized  users  have  the  access  of  the  Y-code  [19].  We  know  nothing  about  the 
encrypted version ranging code. 
 
B.2. Proposed Authenticated GPS Signal for Civil Navigation 
 
The current civil signal has neither encrypted nor authenticated mechanism. Logan Scott proposed 
three levels of authentication on civil navigation system to detect spoofed signals and make it hard for 
a spoofer to generate valid signals [20].  
Data message authentication. The first method is to authenticate navigation data messages using 
public  key  digital  signature.  The  private  key  is  only  available  to  the  control  segment  and  space 
segment and used to sign the data messages. The public key is available to every GPS user. Spoofers 
can  only  authenticate  but  not  generate  false  messages.  Currently  there  are  six  message  types  for 
positioning and error correcting. A new ―Type 7 authentication message‖ is proposed to authenticate Sensors 2010, 10                         
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the GPS data messages. This message would be broadcasted once every 5 minutes. Users won’t be 
able to authenticate until receive both data and authentication messages. 
Public spread code authentication. However, one navigation bit is twenty times longer than one 
PRN code, and this short PRN makes this authentication scheme problematic. Spoofers can simply 
delay the PRN codes while the authenticated navigation messages are still valid and victim receivers 
would not be able to detect this small delay in time. Level 2 authentication is to interleave a spread 
spectrum  security  codes  (SSSC)  with  normal  spreading  codes.  The  digital  signatures  would  be 
broadcasted in  the navigation messages. The receiver  would not  be  able to  track until  the digital 
signature is received, generate a reference SSSC, and despread the received SSSC to validate the 
signal. The received GPS signal has extremely low power so dispreading is a very powerful technique 
to  detect  the  signal.  Technically,  it  is  impossible  for  spoofers  to  know  the  actual  SSSC  without 
despeading it because the code is buries below the thermal noise. 
Private spreading code authentication. The third scheme is similar to level 2 authentication. A 
tamper resistant Civil Antispoof Security Module is used to process private SSSC. This private SSSC 
will be transmitted with respect to the authentication messages that carry the digital signature; thus the 
authentication time is short 
 
B.3. Proposed Authenticated Galileo Signal 
 
Galileo is a European satellite navigation system under civilian control. Several test satellites have 
been launched and the system is expected to be fully operational by 2013 [21]. The authentication 
scheme and its implementation have not been finalized yet. The candidate schemes are from a number 
of  existing  and  proposed  authentication  methods  described  above.  Galileo  will  provide  different 
services:  Open  Service  (OS),  Safety  of  Life  Service  (SoL),  Commercial  Service  (CS)  and  Public 
Regulated  Service  (PRS).  OS  will  have  neither  authentication  nor  encryption;  SoL  will  provide 
authenticated  navigation  data;  CS  will  encrypt  the  navigation  data;  PRS  will  use  both  encrypted 
ranging codes and navigation messages. This results in that the services are different in the levels of 
integrity and security [22]. 
 
B.4. TESLA on eLoran 
 
Unlike GPS and Galileo, Loran does not have spreading codes but measures delays of pulses for 
ranging so the SSSC scheme cannot be applied on Loran. The enhanced or modernized Loran has a 
data channel that carries Loran messages. Therefore, we propose TESLA to authenticate these data 
messages to insure the integrity of the data and authenticity of the source. One important characteristic 
of  TESLA  is  one-way  key  chains:  One  chain  for  MAC  key  generation  and  the  other  chain  for 
transmission. The key chain is broadcasted in the reverse order of the construction. To ensure security, 
the last computed key or first transmitted key should be either embedded or delivered to the receiver 
via a secure channel. This key will be updated periodically as the key chain has finite length but the 
broadcast of navigation data is continuous in time. The update period depends on the key chain length 
and other practical implementation concerns.  Sensors 2010, 10                         
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Appendix C. Generic Attacks 
This section discusses why the tamper-resistant device and self-authenticated signals are important 
for the protocol. Without tamper resistance, attack can break the system in many different ways. A 
threat model of generic attacks is illustrated in Figure 11. The diagram consists of analog segment, 
digital segment and binary segment. The analog segment includes the RF antenna and location sensor 
that capture, condition and digitize the RF signals. The digital segment extracts the location features 
and computes a location tag.  
 
Figure 11. Threat model of generic attacks.  
 
 
The binary segment has the database and matcher, and performs the matching process to verify the 
authenticity  of  the  computed  location  tag.  The  red  arrows  with  labels  represent  the  generic 
cryptographic attacks discussed as follows: 
1.  Insecure  RF  signals.  RF  signals  are  vulnerable  to  jamming  and  spoofing,  which  may  lead  to 
weaknesses in the designed location-based security systems. The purpose of a location tag is to 
provide more security to  a  security system. As such, it is  important that  every  linkage of the 
location-based  security  chain  is  secure.  This  includes  not  only  the  protocol  itself  but  also  the 
broadcast of RF signal. Jammers are radio transmitters that electromagnetically overwhelm the 
radio navigation signals. On the other hand, spoofers trick the navigation receiver into reporting a 
location other than the true location of the receiver. It is difficult to jam or spoof Loran-C signals 
over  the  air  in  the  far  field  [23]  because  such  an  attack  would  require  significant  power  and 
infrastructure. Hence it is either difficult or reasonably detectable. Near field spoofing is a different 
threat but it requires being reasonably close and potentially exposes the attacker. When an attacker 
is close enough to the legitimate user, he can simulate RF signals to forge the correct location tag. 
The security of the RF navigation signal can be provided by message authentication, for example, 
TESLA as we proposed on eLoran. One goal is to prevent the user from being fooled into believing 
that a message comes from a particular source when this is not the case. Another goal is to allow 
the receivers to verify whether the messages have been modified during transmission.  
2.  Replay attack. Attackers may use real  authenticated  Loran signals to bypass the signal source 
verification but modify the received Loran signals and replay to spoof the authentication device. 
The signals after the location sensor is digital. This attack requires the attackers to have signal 
process skills to modify the location features carried on the RF signals. For instance, attackers can 
re-position RF pulses to modify the time-of-arrival and other parameters of the incoming signals. Sensors 2010, 10                         
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3.  Tamper with features. The location feature values can be replaced by the ones selected by attackers. 
This still requires the attackers to bypass the source verification of the authenticated signals. 
4.  Brute force attack. Attackers generate all the possible combinations of the binary tags and replace 
the tag computed from the received location information with one selected. To protect against this 
attack, we need location information has high entropy to result in long location tag. The Loran 
location information measure will be discussed in the later section. 
5.  Tamper with location tag database. The attacks on the template database include adding a new 
template,  modifying  an  existing  template,  removing  templates,  copying  template  data  for 
secondary uses, etc.  
6.  Man  in  the  middle  attack.  The  transmission  medium  between  the  template  database  and  the 
matcher is similarly vulnerable. This can result in an alteration of the transmitted template. 
7.  Override the final  decision. Results  from  the matcher (accept  or reject) can be overridden by 
attackers. If this is a DoS attack, attackers can change the final decision by producing a sufficiently 
large number of errors to the system. The spoofing attacks type 2 through 7 can be defeated by 
using a tamper-resistant device. 
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